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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
v. 
CHANNAN S. SINGH, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
Case No. 900497-CA 
Priority No. 2 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
Jurisdiction is conferred on this Court pursuant ti. iil.il 
Code Ann. § 77-35-26(2)(a) (Supp. 1989) and Utah Code Ann. 
§ 78-2a-3(2) (ft fP .. . i defendant 1 district 
court criminal action may take an appeal to t-he C • Appeals 
nai judgment and conviction for :• _ crime other than a 
first degree or capital ielony. 
STATUTES AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
The pertinent part," I tin: following statutes and 
constitutional provisions are provided in Addend 
Utah Code Ann. § 41-2-102(13) 
Utah Code Ann. § 41-2-111(1) 
Utah Code Ann. § 41-2-133(1) 
Utah Code Ann. § 41-2-133(2) 
Utah Code Ann. § 41-2-404 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-30 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-105 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-402(3)(a) 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-402(4) 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-4-101 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-408(1) 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-412(1)(c) 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-501(1) 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-501(2) 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-501(3)(a) 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
1. For a "writing" to constitute a forgery, must it first 
evidence the existence of a legally enforceable right or privilege? 
(i.e. Is "legal efficacy" a necessary element of forgery?). Since 
this issue involves a question of law, "we [appellate courts] accord 
conclusions of law no particular deference, but review them for 
correctness." Scharf v. BMG Corp., 700 P.2d 1068, 1070 (Utah 1985). 
2. Did the trial court err when it refused to instruct the 
jury on the defendant theories of the case (which included lesser 
included offense instructions)? Where "the requested instruction is 
denied, no prejudicial error occurs if it appears that the giving of 
the requested instruction would not have affected the outcome of the 
trial." State v. McCumber. 622 P.2d 353, 359 (Utah 1980). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS 
This is an appeal from a judgment and conviction for 
Forgery, five counts, all second degree felonies, in violation of 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-501 (1990), with one count enhanced pursuant 
to Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-1001, -1002 (1990) (habitual criminal), in 
the Third Judicial District Court in and for Salt Lake County, State 
of Utah, the Honorable Richard H. Moffat, Judge, presiding. 
Defendant Channan Singh initially moved to quash the 
bindover to the circuit court, alleging that there was insufficient 
evidence for trial. (R 22-26). Mr. Singh later moved to dismiss 
the Information for reasons similar to those stated in his motion to 
quash (the evidence revealed at the preliminary hearing would not 
- 2 -
satisfy each and every e,«- * ,K :I-JO; Singh 
renewed his motion before trial, (T 2-18), and again, 1 .e 
State's case-in-chief, (T 81 ) The court rejected these motions 
and h i s exceptions t o tl le ji u : }. :i i i s t ru r t in HIS. (T 84-85) . 
STATEMENT O F T H E FACTS 
On November 27, 1989, West Valley Detective Hoii111;, Wriqhi 
went to 4 0 ; Benview Drive to buy a driver's license from, an unnamed 
individual • i n<j i v HJUI »I was not there although 
another individual, Channan Singh, sold Detective Wright f;wo 
temporary driver's permits for $100. (T 56-57); see State's 
Exhibit 1; Addendu 
Filled * each permit were the expiration U a W ^ the 
signature for the examiner and the director, the results of the 
examination, .mu i lefitnui urn not at i nn |T 57-58); see State's 
Exhibit The Detective did not see Mr. Singh not df.yont: clur fill 
out the partially completed licenses,. {V 6 8 ) , Left blank on each 
permit were spaces for tht name, address, birth date, height, 
weight, sex, eye color, and signature ol the licensee, ; see 
State's Exhibit 1 
Detect ::i \ * f . a unau the partially completed 
licenses, i i i the form as sold to her, were . r 
permits. (T 6 8 ) ; see State's Exhibits (specifically stated on 
the tempo? iJI y itr i vei * «•• I II'PIIS** is the notation, "Not Valid Without 
Licensee's Signature 1 1); see also iT /'» ( who re in Detei t i .,H»« Mri>i. 
testified that permits without "information as to the identity of 
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the person" would not be valid); cf. (R 32) ("At the preliminary 
hearing Officer Holly Wright and Detective Carroll Mays testified 
that the partially completed forms were not useable as temporary 
permits"). 
On December 7, 1989, Detective Wright purchased two more 
temporary driver's licenses from Mr. Singh for $100. (T 59-60). 
The spaces filled in and left blank on the second set of licenses 
were consistent with the markings and omissions on the first set of 
licenses. Compare State's Exhibit 1 with State's Exhibit 2. 
Detective Wright did not see anyone write on the second set of 
permits, and admitted that their incomplete condition would not make 
them valid. (T 69-70). 
On December 12, 1989, Detective Wright and Detective Mays 
bought 15 blank driver's licenses from Mr. Singh for $400. 
(T 75-77). After Detective Mays indicated that he did not know how 
to complete them, Mr. Singh filled out the signature lines for the 
director and examiner and then marked some results on the 
examination section. (T 76-77). In addition, Mr. Singh instructed 
both detectives on how to fill out the remainder of the form. 
(T 72, 77). None of the temporary licenses, however, were fully 
completed by Mr. Singh. See State's Exhibits 1-3. 
The State charged Mr. Singh with five counts of forgery. 
(R 7-11); (T 20-21). During the lower court proceedings, Mr. Singh 
moved to dismiss the charges, arguing, inter alia, that the invalid 
and incomplete licenses would not (or did not) support the forgery 
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charges. See (R 22-26) (Motion to Quash and accompanying 
memorandum); (R 31-38) (T 2-18) (Rule 12 Motion to Dismiss the 
Information); (T 81) (Motion to Dismiss). Mr. Singh also excepted 
to the court's refusal to charge the jury with his theories of the 
case or the lesser included offenses. (T 110-18). The trial court 
denied Mr. Singh's motions and refused his instructions. (T 18, 85, 
110) . 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
A forged "writing" must evidence the existence of a legally 
enforceable right or privilege. The writing must also appear to 
have been issued by the government. If a driver's license appears 
facially invalid (despite the addition of signatures or markings by 
the defendant), no forgery took place because the admittedly invalid 
and incomplete license would not evidence the privilege to operate a 
motor vehicle. The government would not issue a partially completed 
license and allow the licensee to fill in the blank spaces. Viewing 
the evidence in a light most favorable to the State, the licenses 
were not, nor did they purport to be a "writing issued by a 
government." 
The trial court also erred when it rejected the defendant's 
proposed jury instructions. The jury should have been able to 
consider whether the defendant completed the crime of forgery or 
took only a "substantial step." Forcing the jury to choose between 
forgery or acquittal was improper when other reasonable choices 
existed. 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
SINCE A FORGED "WRITING" MUST BE COMPLETE. 
THE EVIDENCE COULD NOT HAVE SUPPORTED THE 
FORGERY CONVICTIONS 
Prior to trial and, again, following the State's 
case-in-chief, Defendant/Appellant Channan S. Singh moved to dismiss 
the charges, alleging, inter alia, that since the involved licenses 
were facially incomplete they could not be considered forgeries. 
(R 31-38); (T 2-18). Because the licenses were mostly blank they 
would not have, nor purport to have "legal efficacy" (i.e. the 
writing must be complete enough to evidence a legally enforceable 
right or privilege).1 See (R 32-34). A forged "writing" would 
exist only when, and if, a third party filled in the blank spaces. 
In response, the State argued that the forgery statute did 
not require proof of a completed writing. (T 11); Utah Code Ann. 
§ 76-6-501. Instead, the State alleged, all it had to prove was a 
transfer of a writing. (T 11-12). Hence, while neither party 
disputed that a "writing" had to exist, the parties did disagree on 
whether forgery required a completed writing or whether it was 
enough for the license to be partially completed. 
The trial court sided with the State, reasoning: "The 
statute indicates [that it is a forgery if a person acts] 'with 
knowledge that he is facilitating a fraud', all you've got to do is 
know that the document that you are transferring is capable [of] and 
See infra note 3. 
probably will be used in facilitating a fraud." (T 14) (emphasis 
added). Despite the court's reference to "the document," the 
question left unanswered (though later rejected by the court) was 
whether "the document" had to be a completed document. 
The State introduced five2 partially completed "Utah State 
Department of Public Safety Driver License Temporary Counter 
Permit[s]" as evidence of the alleged crimes. See State's 
Exhibits 1-3; (T 58, 61, 78). The Operators' License Act defines 
"license" as "the privilege issued under this chapter to operate a 
motor vehicle." Utah Code Ann. § 41-2-102(13); cf. Utah Code Ann. 
§ 41-2-111(1). Similarly, a forged writing includes "symbols of 
2 Four licenses were already partially filled in by an 
unknown individual prior to their purchase by the detective. See 
State's Exhibits 1 and 2. Detective Wright did not see or know who 
had marked the licenses. (T 68-70). Moreover, since the State 
offered no evidence to show that the signatures and markings on the 
first four licenses were not in fact completed by the authorized 
individuals at a proper time or place, Mr. Singh's conduct in simply 
selling (but not writing on) the four licenses would not constitute 
the crime of forgery. See Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-501. But cf. Utah 
Code Ann. § 76-6-408 (Theft by Receiving Stolen Property). 
Insufficient evidence therefore existed for the first four counts of 
forgery as the State failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that 
the first four licenses were fraudulent. (i.e. If, as the jury must 
have necessarily found, the government would issue partially 
completed licenses, (R 101-11, 120-24), Mr. Singh may have only 
stolen such government writings and then attempted to sell them. 
Cf. Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-408; see infra Point II.C). When State's 
Exhibit 3 (the license Mr. Singh partially filled in) is compared 
with State's Exhibits 1 and 2, the stylistic differences reveal that 
Mr. Singh did not mark the first four licenses. Compare State's 
Exhibit 1 and 2 with State's Exhibit 3 (unlike the four licenses 
already filled in, Mr. Singh's license listed the director and 
examiner as the same person; Mr. Singh did not complete the 
restriction space or the expiration date; and Mr. Singh's penmanship 
is different). 
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value, right, privilege, or identification." Utah Code Ann. 
§ 76-6-501(2); (R 111). Because the State classified the forgeries 
as second degree felonies, it was also required to prove that the 
writing was (or purportedly had been) "issued by a government, or 
any agency thereof[.]" Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-501 (3); (T 14); 
(R 102, 104, 106, 108, 110). As discussed below, the necessary 
implications of the these statutory provisions required the 
"writing" to be (or appear) complete.3 
If, as in the case at bar, a "writing" contained blank 
spaces, it would have no legal effect and could not be considered a 
governmentally issued instrument. Cf. State v. Ortega, 418 N.W.2d 
57 (Iowa 1988); (T 4-5, 8, 13-14). In Ortega, the State argued that 
creating blank driver's license forms should be criminal because of 
"the existence of an illegal market for forms of false 
identification[.]" 418 N.W.2d at 59. The Ortega Court disagreed, 
finding that since the blank forms were not public documents and 
void on their face, they could not be considered forgeries. A 
person would first have to complete the license before it appeared 
3
 Mr. Singh does not contend that in order to be 
"complete," every "i" must be dotted or every "t" must be crossed. 
Rather, the writing must at least appear complete enough to be a 
symbol "of value, right, privilege, or identification." Utah Code 
Ann. § 76-6-501(2); cf. Utah Code Ann. § 41-2-102(13); Utah Code 
Ann. § 41-2-404(1); State v. Ortega, 418 N.W.2d 57, 59 (Iowa 1988) 
("blank computer printed forms [driver's licenses], having no legal 
efficacy, are void on their face [as they] evidence no legally 
enforceable right and therefore have no capacity to deceive anyone 
concerning rights or liabilities affected by government"). 
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to "evidence the completed acts of any public servants . . . ." 
Id. Prior to their completion, no forgery exists. 
Utah/s Code may not explicitly list the common law element 
of "legal efficacy" in its forgery statute, see Utah Code Ann. 
§ 76-6-501, but the forgery charges nonetheless require the 
"writing" to symbolize a right or privilege issued by the 
government. Id. No privilege attaches to an invalid license. 
Conspicuously displayed on each license is the following notation: 
"Not Valid Without Licensee's Signature." See State's 
Exhibits 1-3. The plain language of the permit unequivocally 
demands that the licensee sign the permit. As long as the 
licensee's signature line remains blank, the license cannot be 
considered a valid writing issued by the government. Hence, even if 
an authorized examiner and director signed their names and filled in 
all the necessary information, a license lacking the licensee's 
signature would still appear invalid. See State's Exhibits 1-3. 
The licenses here contained far more blank spaces than a 
licensee's signature line. All the spaces identifying the licensee 
were left blank. Facially void, the arresting officers even 
admitted that the confiscated forms were not useable in their 
present form as temporary driver's permits. (R 32); (T 68, 79) . 
The numerous blank spaces made it apparent that the licenses had not 
been issued by the government. Cf. Utah Code Ann. § 41-2-404(1). 
Absent completion of the pertinent identifying information, the 
partially completed licenses did not appear to be symbols "of value, 
- 9 -
right, privilege, or identification." Utah Code Ann. 
§ 76-6-501(2). No "writing" therefore existed. 
Moreover, as a practical matter, no one4 would accept such 
a license as evidence of a privilege. For example, if an officer 
stopped an unlicensed driver who produced one of Mr. Singh,s 
licenses, the officer would not consider the license to have been 
issued by the government. The Division of Motor Vehicles would not 
issue a predominately blank license, nor allow the licensee to 
independently fill in the necessary information. £f. Utah Code Ann. 
§ 41-2-404(1). No "writing," and consequently, no forgery exists 
when the driver's license remains substantially incomplete. Only 
when, and if, the unlicensed driver fills in the blanks will the 
writing appear legally and governmentally issued. The evidence was 
insufficient to support the forgery convictions. See State's 
Exhibits 1-3; (T 58, 61, 78). 
POINT II 
THE DEFENDANT WAS ENTITLED TO CHARGE THE 
JURY WITH THE LESSER INCLUDED OFFENSES. 
Assuming, arguendo, the trial court properly concluded that 
a "writing" issued by the government (the temporary driver's 
licenses) may be totally devoid of information identifying the 
4
 Indeed, if a minor attempted to buy alcohol with a 
license containing no indicia of identification (e.g. no age, name, 
or height), the minor would leave empty-handed. The minor's 
"license" would not satisfy the cashier because of its incomplete 
nature. Absent the inclusion of the required identification by the 
minor, the license would not be (nor purport to be) governmentally 
issued. Cf. Utah Code Ann. § 41-2-404. 
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applicant, the court nonetheless erred when it refused to instruct 
the jury with the defendants requested instructions on Attempted 
Forgery, Prohibited Use of a License, and Theft by Receiving Stolen 
Property. (T 110-18); (R 60-81). "If there [is] any evidence, 
however slight, on any reasonable theory of the case under which 
defendant might be convicted of a lesser included offense, the trial 
court must, if requested, give an appropriate instruction." State 
v. Chesnut. 621 P.2d 1228 (Utah 1980) (emphasis in original); State 
v. Baker. 671 P.2d 152, 157 (Utah 1983) ("where proof of an element 
of the crime is in dispute, the availability of the "third 
option"—the choice of conviction of a lesser offense rather than 
conviction of the greater or acquittal—gives the defendant the 
benefit of the reasonable doubt standard"). 
The instruction for a lesser included offense "must be 
given if (i) the statutory elements of greater and lesser included 
offenses overlap to some degree, and (ii) the evidence provides a 
'rational basis for a verdict acquitting the defendant of the 
offense charged and convicting him of the included offense.'" State 
v. Hansen. 734 P.2d 421, 424 (Utah 1986) (construing State v. Baker, 
671 P.2d 152, 159 (Utah 1983)); Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-402(4) 
(1990). The two pronged Baker analysis "should be liberally 
construed." Hansen, 734 P.2d at 424, especially where, as here, the 
defendant requested the lesser included offense instruction.5 
5
 The prosecution must show more compelling circumstances 
than the defendant when it requests the lesser included offense 
-[footnote continued on next page]-
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If a defendant requests a lesser included instruction, 
as was the case here, an evidence-based standard 
controls. . . • If the same facts tend to prove 
elements of more than one statutory offense and the 
evidence is ambiguous and susceptible to alternative 
explanations, the trial court must give the lesser 
included offense instruction if any one of the 
alternative interpretations provides both a rational 
basis for a verdict acquitting the defendant of the 
offense charged and convicting him of the included 
offense. . . . [I]n determining whether a rational 
jury could acquit on the greater charge and find guilt 
on the lesser charge, the court must view the evidence 
and the inferences that can be drawn from it in the 
light most favorable to the defendant. 
State v. Velarde. 734 P.2d 449, 451 (Utah 1986) (emphasis added and 
footnotes omitted). 
A. THE COURT SHOULD HAVE PROVIDED THE JURY WITH AN 
"ATTEMPTED FORGERY" INSTRUCTION. 
The statutory elements of forgery and attempted forgery 
necessarily overlap with one another. See Utah Code Ann. 
§§ 76-4-101, 76-6-501; cf. State v. Hansen, 734 P.2d 421, 424 (Utah 
1986) ("the test is whether the elements overlap at all"); State v. 
Brown, 694 P.2d 587, 589 (Utah 1984) (emphasis in original) ("there 
must be some overlap in the definitions of the two crimes, even 
though they need not meet the totally 'included' standard"). Thus, 
the first prong of Baker was satisfied. 
5 -[cont'd]- instruction. State v. Hansen, 734 P.2d 421, 
424 n.5 (Utah 1986). Unlike the minimal standard placed on the 
defendant, see id. at 424 ("the test is whether the elements overlap 
at all"), "when the prosecution seeks instruction on a proposed 
lesser included offense, both the legal elements and the actual 
evidence or inferences needed to demonstrate those elements must 
necessarily be included within the original charge offense. State 
v. Baker. 671 P.2d 152, 156 (Utah 1983) (emphasis in original). 
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The evidence presented at trial also satisfied the second 
prong. "Clearly, under Utah law, the crime of attempted forgery 
involves the same culpability and dishonesty as does the crime of 
forgery itself." State v. Ross. 782 P.2d 529, 531 (Utah App. 
1989) . Since Mr. Singh left most of the license blank, the jury may 
have believed that he did not fully satisfy the act of forgery. 
Even if "legal efficacy" is not a required element of the 
forgery statute, the jury still may have considered the blank spaces 
significant enough to acquit Mr. Singh of forgery had the lesser 
included offense of attempted forgery been available. Mr. Singh's 
conduct may have been viewed as a "substantial step" towards the 
making, completing, or transferring of a writing which purported to 
be the act of another. Hence, there was "a rational basis for . . . 
acquitting the defendant of [forgery] and convicting him of 
[attempted forgery]." Baker, 671 P.2d at 159; cf. State v. Brown, 
694 P.2d 587, 590 (Utah 1984) (if the jury could have accepted the 
defendant's testimony concerning a lesser included offense, "however 
unlikely that might have been," it was error to refuse the 
instruction). Both prongs were satisfied. 
Without the attempted forgery instruction, the jury was 
left with two choices: guilty of forgery or complete acquittal. 
(R 117-18). Apparently believing that Mr. Singh had done something 
wrong, the jury opted for a conviction. Cf. Keeble v. United 
States, 412 U.S. 205, 213 (1973) (emphasis in original) ("Where one 
of the elements of the offense charged remains in doubt, but the 
defendant is plainly guilty of some offense, the jury is likely to 
- 13 -
resolve its doubts in favor of conviction"); State v. Hansen, 
734P.2d 421, 428 (Utah 1986) ("This is exactly the sort of forced 
choice that lesser included offense instructions are designed to 
avoid, and exactly the choice that the jury would not have had to 
make if [the lesser included offense] instruction had been given"). 
The trial court erred in refusing to give the attempted forgery 
instruction. (R 72-81). 
The trial court attempted to justify its refusal, reasoning 
that forgery does not require a "transfer" and Mr. Singh did more 
than merely "attempt" the act of forgery. See (T 85). As explained 
above, even if the trial court was correct, the perceived completion 
of the crime provided no basis for refusing the defendant's 
"attempt" instruction. Cf. State v. Baker, 671 P.2d 152, 159 (Utah 
1983) ("The court must only decide whether there is a sufficient 
quantum of evidence presented to justify sending the cfuestion to the 
jury, . . . if there is a sufficient quantum of evidence to raise a 
jury question regarding a lesser offense, then the court should 
instruct the jury regarding the lesser offense"). 
Moreover, despite noting the abrogation of common law, see 
(T 85), the trial court's rejection of the attempted forgery 
instruction was ironically supported by a now outdated common law 
rule. In State v. Burks. 29 Utah 2d 378, 510 P.2d 532 (1973), the 
Court acknowledged that common law prohibited a defendant from being 
"convicted of the crime of attempt, if in fact the crime had been 
completed[.]" 510 P.2d at 533. Similarly, if the trial court here 
was indeed correct in believing that Mr. Singh had actually 
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consummated the crime of forgery, common law then would have 
precluded the court from charging him with attempted forgery. 
However, since the common law prohibition is no longer in 
force,6 the court's decision was flawed. An individual may also be 
charged with "attempted forgery" notwithstanding the perceived or 
actual completion of the crime. The court must let the jury decide 
whether the defendant completed the crime or simply made an attempt. 
B. THE COURT SHOULD HAVE PROVIDED THE JURY WITH A 
"PROHIBITED USE OF A LICENSE" INSTRUCTION. 
The trial court also erred when it rejected the defendant's 
Prohibited Use of a License instruction. (R 62-71); Utah Code Ann. 
§ 41-2-133. "Prohibited Use of a License" forbids a person from 
causing or permitting the display of a fictitious license. Utah 
Code Ann. § 41-2-133(1); see also Utah Code Ann. § 41-2-133(2) (it 
is unlawful for a person to "lend or knowingly permit the use of a 
license issued to him, by a person not entitled to it"). "Forgery" 
similarly requires, inter alia, that a person act with the purpose 
to defraud or facilitate a fraud. Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-501(1). 
The trial court and the State both acknowledged the overlapping 
nature of the charges: 
6
 The Burks Court cited Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-30 (1953) 
as authority for rejecting the common law prohibition. See State v. 
Burks, 29 Utah 2d 378, 510 P.2d 532, 533 (1973). This statutory 
provision has since been repealed. Nevertheless, the existing 
statute which repealed and replaced the old provision also abrogates 
the common law. See Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-105 (1973 & Supp. 1990). 
Thus, the principles of Burks still hold true for the instant action. 
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[The State]: We couldn't charge under that statute 
[Utah Code Ann. § 41-2-133], Judge. 
The Court: You could have under (1). You could have 
charged under 41-2-133. It's a misdemeanor for a 
person to display or cause or permit to be displayed 
or to have in possession any license knowing it is 
fictitious, [you] could have charged under that if you 
had wished to. 
What you're saying is, you charged under the 
fraud statute because you had the transfer. 
[The State]: And the additional element raised it to 
this charge [forgery]. 
(T 18) . 
The State's concerns were irrelevant. Even if the greater 
offense includes additional elements, the lesser offense may still 
be included. See State v. Hansen, 734 P.2d 421, 424 (Utah 1986) 
(requiring only "overlap to some degree"); State v. Baker, 671 P.2d 
152, 159 (Utah 1983) ("where two offenses are related because some 
of their statutory elements overlap, and where the evidence at the 
trial of the greater offense includes proof of some or all of those 
overlapping elements, the lesser offense is an included offense 
under [Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-402](3)(a)"). Moreover, the court 
cannot, on the one hand, hold that Forgery does not require a 
transfer, (T 85), and then, on the other, reject the Prohibited Use 
of a License instruction because it did not contain the element of a 
"transfer." The first prong of Baker was satisfied. 
As alluded to by the court, the second prong was also 
satisfied. Detectives Wright and Mays watched Mr. Singh, an 
individual not authorized to act on behalf of the State, partially 
complete a temporary driver's license. (T 76-77). Previously, on 
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November 27, 1989, and December 7, 1989, Mr. Singh possessed and 
sold Detective Wright a pair of similarly marked licenses. 
(T 57-60). If these partially completed licenses were in fact valid 
and if, as discussed before the jury could have viewed Mr. Singh's 
conduct as falling short of the completed crime of forgery, the 
evidence provided a rational basis for acquitting him of the greater 
offense and convicting him of the included offense. Hansen, 734 
P.2d at 424. The trial court erred in refusing Mr. Singh's proposed 
instructions. (R 62-71). 
C THE COURT SHOULD HAVE PROVIDED THE JURY WITH A 
"THEFT BY RECEIVING STOLEN PROPERTY" INSTRUCTION. 
Another instruction discounted by the trial court was Theft 
by Receiving Stolen Property. (R 60-61); Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-408; 
-412(1)(c). "A person commits theft if he receives, retains, or 
disposes of the property of another . . . or aids in concealing, 
selling, or withholding any such property from the owner, knowing 
the property to be stolen, with a purpose to deprive the owner 
thereof." Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-408(1). Forgery requires that a 
person act with the purpose to defraud or facilitate a fraud. Utah 
Code Ann. § 76-6-501(1). The overlapping element of fraudulent 
conduct thus satisfied the first prong. 
Since the jury convicted Mr. Singh of a second degree 
felony, it must have necessarily believed that the writing was or 
purportedly had been "issued by a government, or any agency 
thereof[.]" Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-501(3)(a); (R 102, 104, 106, 108, 
110); see State's Exhibits 1-3. When Mr. Singh sold the licenses, 
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the jury may have rationally believed that he "dispose[d] of the 
property of another knowing that it ha[d] been stolen . . . ." Utah 
Code Ann. § 76-6-408(1). As stated above, the jury may have also 
acquitted him of forgery. Because the second prong was therefore 
satisfied, the trial court should not have refused Mr. Singh's 
requested instructions. (R 60-61). 
POINT III 
THE DEFENDANT WAS ENTITLED TO INFORM THE 
JURY OF HIS THEORY OF THE CASE. 
Assuming further that, for some reason, the defendant/s 
requested instructions did not qualify as lesser included offenses, 
they still supported his theories and should have been considered by 
the jury. 
The well-recognized general rule entitles a party to 
have his theory of the case submitted to the jury. 
Where there is evidence adduced to support a party's 
theory of the case, it is prejudicial error for the 
trial court to fail to instruct thereon. 
Nevertheless, the court cannot be said to have failed 
to properly instruct the jury when requested 
instructions are fully covered in other instructions 
given. 
Watters v. Ouerry. 626 P.2d 455, 458-59 (Utah 1981); State v. Alv, 
782 P.2d 549, 550 (Utah App. 1989) ("A criminal defendant is 
entitled to have the gist of his defense reflected in the 
instructions given to the jury, and the instructions should not 
incorrectly or misleadingly state the material rules of law"); State 
v. Torres, 619 P.2d 694, 695 (Utah 1980) ("We are not concerned with 
the reasonableness, nor the credibility of the defendant's evidence 
relating to his claim of self defense [the theory of the case as 
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long as] . . . there is any reasonable basis in the evidence to 
justify it"). 
As noted above, the evidence reasonably supported the 
inclusion of the instructions on Attempted Forgery, Prohibited Use 
of a License,7 and Theft by Receiving Property. The defendant's 
requested instructions were not covered by the court's other 
instructions. The trial court erred when it rejected the 
defendant's theories. 
7
 Mr. Singh also noted that "Prohibited Use of a License" 
was more specifically tailored for the involved conduct than the 
generally worded Forgery statute. (T 14-16, 115); compare Utah Code 
Ann. § 41-2-133 with Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-501. As stated in 
Helmuth v. Morris, 598 P.2d 333 (Utah 1979), if a Controlled 
Substances Act provision "is specifically designed to prohibit the 
presentation of false or forged prescriptions" it governs over the 
more generally restrictive forgery statute. Id. at 335. 
Mr. Singh's proposed "Operators' License Act" provision should have 
similarly governed over the generally worded forgery statute. See 
id. ("where two statutes interdict the same conduct, but impose 
different penalties, the violator is entitled to the lesser 
punishment"); State v. Shondel, 22 Utah 2d 343, 453 P.2d 146, 148 
(1969) ("where there is doubt or uncertainty as to which of two 
punishments is applicable to an offense an accused is entitled to 
the benefit of the lesser"). The trial court erred in using the 
statute which allowed the greater punishment. 
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CONCLUSION 
Appellant respectfully requests that this Court reverse his 
conviction because there was insufficient evidence to support the 
forgery charges or reverse the case and remand for a new trial with 
the addition of his proposed jury instructions. 
SUBMITTED this /j day of January9/f 1991. 
RONALD S. FUJINO 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY 
I, RONALD S. FUJINO, hereby certify that eight copies of the 
foregoing will be delivered to the Utah Court of Appeals, 400 
Midtown Plaza, 230 South 500 East, Salt Lake City, Utah 84102, and 
four copies to the Attorney General,s Office, 236 State Capitol, 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114, this I1} day of January, 1991. 
RONALD S. FUJINO 
- 20 -
Delivered by 
this day of January, 1991. 
- 21 
ADDENDUM A 
41-2-102 MOTOR VEHICLES 
41-2-102. Definitions. 
As used in this chapter: „ 
(1) "Cancellation" means the termination by action of the division of 
license issued through error or fraud or for which necessary consent 
been withdrawn. 
(2) "Class D license" means the class of license issued for vehicles n 
defined as commercial vehicles or motorcycles under this title. i 
(3) "Class M license" means the class of license issued for a motorcycl< 
as defined under this chapter. i 
(4) "Commercial driver license (CDL)" means a license issued substan 
tially in accordance with the requirements of Title XII, Pub. L. 99-571 
the Commercial Motor Vehicle Safety Act of 1986, and in accordance witi 
Part 7, Chapter 2, Title 41, which authorizes the holder to drive a class di 
commercial motor vehicle. ] 
(5) (a) "Commercial motor vehicle" means a motor vehicle designed o: 
used to transport passengers or property if the vehicle: 
(i) has a gross vehicle weight rating of 26,001 or more pomn 
or a lesser rating as determined by federal regulation; •« 
(ii) is designed to transport more than 15 passengers, includ 
ing the driver; or ^ 
(iii) is transporting hazardous materials and is required to be 
placarded in accordance with 49 C.F.R. Part 172, Subpart P. 
Ob) The following vehicles are not considered a commercial motoi 
vehicle for purposes of Part 7, Chapter 2, Title 41, the Uniform Com-
mercial Driver License Act: \ 
(i) equipment owned and operated by the United States De-* 
partment of Defense when operated by any active duty military^ 
personnel and members of the reserves and national guard on* 
active duty including personnel on full-time national guard duty,! 
personnel on part-time training, and national guard military 
technicians and civilians who are required to wear military uni-i 
forms and are subject to the code of military justice; ^ 
(ii) vehicles controlled and operated by a farmer to transport 
agricultural products, farm machinery, or farm supplies to or 
from a farm within 150 miles of his farm but not in operation as 
contract or common motor carrier; 
(iii) firefighting and emergency vehicles; and 
(iv) recreational vehicles that are not used in commerce and 
are operated solely as family or personal conveyances for recrea-
tional purposes. j 
(6) "Commissioner" means the commissioner of the Department of Pub-1] 
lie Safety. 
(7) "Denial" or "denied" means the withdrawal of a driving privilege by 
the division to which the provisions of Part IV, Chapter 12a, Title 41, ' 
Proof of Owner's or Operator's Security, do not apply. 
(8) "Disqualification" means either: I 
(a) the suspension, revocation, cancellation, denial, or any other J 
withdrawal by a state of a person's privileges to drive a commercial 
motor vehicle; 
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(b) a determination by the Federal Highway Administration, un-
der 49 C.F.R. Part 386, that a person is no longer qualified to operate 
a commercial motor vehicle under 49 C.F.R. Part 391; or 
(c) the loss of qualification which automatically follows conviction 
of an offense listed in 49 C.F.R. Part 383.51. 
(9) "Division" means the Driver License Division of the Department of 
Public Safety. 
(10) "Drive" means: 
(a) to operate or be in physical control of a motor vehicle upon a 
highway; and 
(b) in Subsections 41-2-715(1) through (3), Subsection 41-2-715(5), 
and Sections 41-2-716 and 41-2-717, the operation or physical control 
of a motor vehicle at any place within the state. 
(11) "Farm tractor" means every motor vehicle designed and used pri-
marily as a farm implement for drawing plows, mowing machines, and 
other implements of husbandry. 
(12) "Highway" means the entire width between property lines of every 
way or place of any nature when any part of it is open to the use of the 
public, as a matter of right, for vehicular traffic. 
(13) "License" means the privilege issued under this chapter to operate 
a motor vehicle. 
(14) "License certificate" means the evidence of the privilege issued 
under this chapter to operate a motor vehicle. 
(15) "Motor vehicle" means every self-propelled vehicle and every vehi-
cle propelled by electric power obtained from overhead trolley wires, but 
not operated upon rails, except motorized wheel chairs and vehicles 
moved solely by human power. 
(16) "Motorcycle" means every motor vehicle, other than a tractor, hav-
ing a seat or saddle for the use of the rider and designed to travel with not 
more than three wheels in contact with the ground. 
(17) "Nonresident" means a person who is not a resident of this state 
and who has not sojourned or engaged in any gainful occupation in this 
state for an aggregate period of 60 days in the preceding 12 months and 
also every person who is temporarily assigned by his employer to work in 
Utah. 
(18) "Operate" means to be in actual physical control of a motor vehi-
cle. 
(19) "Operator" means any person who is in actual physical control of a 
vehicle. 
(20) "Owner" means a person other than a lienholder having an inter-
est in the property or title to a vehicle. The term includes a person enti-
tled to the use and possession of a vehicle subject to a security interest in 
another person but excludes a lessee under a lease not intended as secu-
rity. 
(21) "Person" means every natural person, firm, partnership, associa-
tion, or corporation. 
(22) "Reportable violation" means an offense required to be reported to 
the Driver License Division as determined by the division and includes 
those offenses against which points are assessed under Section 41-2-128. 
(23) "Revocation" means the termination by action of the division of a 
licensee's privilege to operate a motor vehicle. 
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41-2-111. Temporary learner permit — Instruction permit 
— Commercial driver instruction permit. 
(1) (a) The division upon receiving an application for a class D or M license 
from a person 16 years of age or older may in its discretion issue a tempo-
rary learner permit after the person has successfully passed all parts of 
the examination not involving the actual operation of a motor vehicle. 
(b) The temporary learner permit allows the applicant, while having 
the permit in his immediate possession, to operate a motor vehicle upon 
the highways for six months from the date of the application in confor-
mance with the restrictions indicated on the permit as determined by 
rules of the division, 
(2) The division upon receiving an application may in its discretion issue an 
instruction permit effective for one year to an applicant who is enrolled in a 
driver education program that includes practice driving if the program is 
approved by the State Office of Education even though the applicant has not 
reached the legal age to be eligible for a license. The instruction permit enti-
tles the permittee when he has the permit in his immediate possession to 
operate a motor vehicle, only when an approved instructor is occupying a seat 
beside the permittee. 
41-2-133, Prohibited uses of license — Penalty. 
It is a class B misdemeanor for a person to: 
(1) display or cause or permit to be displayed or to have in possession 
any license knowing it is fictitious or has been canceled, denied, revoked, 
suspended, disqualified, or altered; 
(2) lend or knowingly permit the use of a license issued to him, by a 
person not entitled to it; 
(3) display or to represent as his own a license not issued to him; 
(4) fail or refuse to surrender to the division upon demand any license 
which has been denied, suspended, disqualified, canceled, or revoked; 
(5) use a false name or give a false address in any application for a 
license or any renewal or duplicate of the license, or to knowingly make a 
false statement, or to knowingly conceal a material fact or otherwise 
commit a fraud in the application; or 
(6) permit any other prohibited use of a license issued to him. 
41-2-404. Identification card — Contents — Specifications. 
(1) The commissioner shall issue a card of identification which provides all 
the information contained in the application, other than place of birth, and a 
photograph of the applicant and facsimile of the applicant's signature. 
(2) The card shall be of an impervious material, resistant to wear, damage, 
and alteration. The size, form, and color of the card is prescribed by the 
commissioner. 
(3) At the applicant's request, the card may include a statement that the 
applicant has a special medical problem or allergies to certain drugs, for the 
purpose of medical treatment. 
(4) The card may also indicate the applicant's intent to make an anatomical 
gift, under the same procedure as provided for an operator license under 
Subsection 41-2-121(3). 
76-1-30 
"This section specifically provides that a person may be 
convicted of an attempt to commit a crime, although it 
appears on the trial that the crime intended or attempted 
was perpetrated by such person in pursuance of such attempt," 
State v. Burks, 29 Utah 2d 378- 510 P.2d 532, 533 (1973). 
76-1-105. Common law crimes abolished* 
Common law crimes are abolished and no conduct is a crime unless made so 
by this code, other applicable statute or ordinance. 
History: C. 1953, 76-1-105, enacted by L. 
1973, ch. 196, § 76-1-105; 1974, ch. 32, § 1. 
76-1-402. Separate offenses arising out of single criminal 
episode —• Included offenses* 
(3) A defendant may be convicted of an offense included in the ofifense 
charged but may not be convicted of both the offense charged and the included 
offense. An offense is so included when: 
(a) It is established by proof of the same or less than all the facts 
required to establish the commission of the offense charged; or 
(b) It constitutes an attempt, solicitation, conspiracy, or form of prepa-
ration to commit the offense charged or an offense otherwise included 
therein; or 
(c) It is specifically designated by a statute as a lesser included offense. 
(4) The court shall not be obligated to charge the jury with respect to an 
included offense unless there is a rational basis for a verdict acquitting the 
defendant of the offense charged and convicting him of the included offense. 
76-4-101. Attempt — Elements of offense. 
(1) For purposes of this part a person is guilty of an attempt to commit a 
crime if, acting with the kind of culpability otherwise required for the com-
mission of the offense, he engages in conduct constituting a substantial step 
toward commission of the offense. 
(2) For purposes of this part, conduct does not constitute a substantial step 
unless it is strongly corroborative of the actor's intent to commit the offense. 
(3) No defense to the offense of attempt shall arise: 
(a) Because the offense attempted was actually committed; or 
(b) Due to factual or legal impossibility if the offense could have been 
committed had the attendant circumstances been as the actor believed 
them to be. 
76-6-408. Receiving stolen property — Duties of pawnbro-
kers. 
(1) A person commits theft if he receives, retains, or disposes of the property 
of another knowing that it has been stolen, or believing that it probably has 
been stolen, or who conceals, sells, withholds or aids in concealing, selling, or 
withholding any such property from the owner, knowing the property to be 
stolen, with a purpose to deprive the owner thereof. 
76-6-412. Theft — Classification of offenses — Action for 
treble damages against receiver of stolen prop-
erty. 
(1) Theft of property and services as provided in this chapter shall be pun-
ishable: 
(a) as a felony of the second degree if the: 
(i) value of the property or services exceeds $1,000; 
(ii) property stolen is a firearm or an operable motor vehicle; 
(iii) actor is armed with a deadly weapon at the time of the theft; 
or 
(iv) property is stolen from the person of another; 
(b) as a felony of the third degree if the: 
(i) value of the property or services is more than $250 but not more 
than $1,000; 
(ii) actor has been twice before convicted of theft, any robbery, or 
any burglary with intent to commit theft; or 
(iii) property taken is a stallion, mare, colt, gelding, cow, heifer, 
steer, ox, bull, calf, sheep, goat, mule, jack, jenny, swine, or poultry; 
(c) as a class A misdemeanor if the value of the property stolen was 
more than $100 but does not exceed $250; or 
(d) as a class B misdemeanor if the value of the property stolen was 
$100 or less. 
76-6-501. Forgery — "Writing" defined. 
(1) A person is guilty of forgery if, with purpose to defraud anyone, or with 
knowledge that he is facilitating a fraud to be perpetrated by anyone, he: 
(a) Alters any writing of another without his authority or utters any 
such altered writing; or 
(b) Makes, completes, executes, authenticates, issues, transfers, pub-
lishes, or utters any writing so that the writing or the making, comple-
tion, execution, authentication, issuance, transference, publication or ut-
terance purports to be the act of another, whether the person is existent 
or nonexistent, or purports to have been executed at a time or place or in 
a numbered sequence other than was in fact the case, or to be a copy of an 
original when no such original existed. 
(2) As used in this section "writing" includes printing or any other method 
of recording information, checks, tokens, stamps, seals, credit cards, badges, 
trademarks, money, and any other symbols of value, right, privilege, or iden-
tification. 
(3) Forgery is a felony of the second degree if the writing is or purports to 
be: 
(a) A security, revenue stamp, or any other instrument or writing is-
sued by a government, or any agency thereof; or 
(b) A check with a face amount of $100 or more, an issue of stocks, 
bonds, or any other instrument or writing representing an interest in or 
claim against property, or a pecuniary interest in or claim against any 
person or enterprise. 
ADDENDUM B 
1-3 
UTAH STATE DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC SAFETY 
Driver License Temporary Counter Permit 
DLD-50 (P-2023) R«v 2-«7 
CURRENT UTAH DRIVER LICENSE NO. 
ADULT 21 MINOR D ^ 7 
CLASS D MOTORCYCLE D 
NAME 
AOORESS 
RESULTS OF EXAMINATION 
NO RESULT 
^ ^ 
EXAMINER I t DATE ZMS^M 
TEMPORARY DRIVING PERMIT 
When COMPLETED and SIGNED by A DRIVER 
LICENSE EXAMINER THIS IS YOUR TEMPORARY 
PERMIT TO DRIVE UNTIL YOU RECEIVE 
YOUR PERMANENT ORIVER LICENSE „ 
EXPIRATION D/yffc /fiX* 7 ~ ' / / ^ 
INSTRUCTION (LEARNER) PERMIT 
D THIS PERMIT ALLOWS YOU TO DRIVE A 
MOTOR VEHICLE (EXCEPT MOTOR 
CYCLES) WHEN ACCOMPANIED BY A 
LICENSED DRIVER ONLY 
D ORJVE A MOTORCYCLE WITHOUT PAS • 
SENGERS. DAYLIGHT HOURS ONLY. 
AND NOT TO DR»/E ON MAJOR ROADS 
EXPIRATION DATE 
UTAH STATE DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC SAFETY 
Driver License Temporary Counter Permit 
CURRENT UTAH DRIVER LICENSE NO. 
ADULT & MINOR D fl 
CLASS • MOTORCYCLE D 
NAME 
ADDRESS 
DATE 1 9 , 
HEIGHT 
FT IN 
SEX 
BIRTH OATE 
WEIGHT 
LBS. 
EYES 
RESTRICT.^  j ry- p 'f 
DLD-50 (P-2023) Rev 2-67 
RESULTS OF EXAMINATION 
NO RESULT EXAMINER DATE 
EEZT 
EX U 
V' wm 
TEMPORARY DRIVING PERMIT 
Wh«nCOMPLETED and SIGNED by A DRIVER 
LICENSE EXAMINER THIS IS YOUR TEMPORARY 
PERMIT TO DRIVE UNTIL YOU RECEIVE 
YOUR PERMANENT DRIVER LICENSE* 
INSTRUCTION (LEARNER) PERMIT 
• THIS PERMIT ALLOWS YOU TO DRIVE A 
MOTOR VEHICLE (EXCEPT MOTOR-
CYCLES) WHEN ACCOMPANIED BY A 
LICENSED ORIVER ONLY 
• DRIVE A MOTORCYCLE WITHOUT PAS-
SENGERS. DAYLIGHT HOURS ONLY. 
AND NOT T015&I VE ON MAJOR ROADS 
EXAMINER 
EXPIRATION DATE 
rfb&/&*y &we 
" / 
P,Jd"/ 
UTAH STATE DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC SAFETY 
Driver License Temporary Counter Permit 
CURRENT UTAH DRIVER LICENSE NO 
ADULT • MINOR U C 
CLASS D MOTORCYCLE D 
NAME 
ADDRESS 
DATE 19 . 
HEIGHT 
FT 
SEX 
RESTRICTION^ 
IN | 
53 
BIRTH DATE 
WEIGHT 
LBS 
EYES 
G~ST*L^ 
Signature, 
X 
ERASURES ALTERATIONS AND/OR Ol 
THIS PERMITVND MAY RflgJJLT IN TH 
DRIVING PRIVILEGE 
^ITERATIONS WILL VOID 
SUSPENSION OF YOUR 
DLO-50 (P-2023) R«v 2-87 
EXAMINER I Q 
RESULTS OF EXAMINATION 
NO RESULT 
-m 
7T& S 
EXAMINER DATE I 
TEMPORARY DRIVING PERMIT 
When COMPLETED and SIGNED by A DRIVER 
LICENSE EXAMINER THIS IS YOUR TEMPORARY 
PERMIT TO DRIVE UNTIL YOU RECEIVE 
YOUR PERMANENT DRIVER LICENSE 
EXPIRATION OA/f$ A/s2\^*kj\ 
INSTRUCTION (LEARNER) PERMIT 
D THIS PERMIT ALLOWS YOU TO DRIVE A 
MOTOR VEHICLE (EXCEPT MOTOR 
CYCLES) WHEN ACCOMPANIED BY A 
LICENSED DRIVER ONLY 
D DRIVE A MOTORCYCLE WITHOUT PAS 
SENGERS DAYLIGHT HOURS ONLY 
AND NOT TQ-O^RIVE ON MAJOR ROAJDS 
M-^FW 
UTAH STATE DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC SAFETY 
* Driver License Temporary Counter Permit 
DLD-50 (P-2023) R«v 2-87 
/\A^^ 
0£/&te87 
rzdrrft&v / 
UTAH STATE DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC SAFETY 
Driver License Temporary Counter Permit 
CURRENT UTAH DRIVER LICENSE NO 
ADULT D MINOR D 
CLASS • MOTORCYCLE D 
NAME 
ADDRESS 
DATE - 1 9 . 
HEIGHT 
FT IN 
SEX 
BIRTH DATE 
WEIGHT 
LBS. 
EYES 
RESTRICTION 
Signature 
DLD-50 (P-2023) R«v 2 87 
RESULTS OF EXAMINATION 
NO RESULT 
2M 
EXAMINER • I DATE 
TEMPORARY DRIVING PERMIT 
When COMPLETED and SIGNED by A DRIVER 
LICENSE EXAMINER THIS IS YOUR TEMPORARY 
PERMIT TO DRIVE UNTIL YOU RECEIVE 
YOUR PERMANENT DRIVER LICENSE 
EXPIRATION D, 
EXAMINER 
EXPIRATION DATE 
